Heidegger’s Personal Ontochronology
These translations are designed to cut through Heidegger's deliberately enigmatic language to provide the most accessible reading experience possible. Footnotes have been removed, complex and specific terminology has been translated as literally as possible, and complex sentences have been simplified. Heidegger has historically been one of the most inaccessible of modern philosophers, but his nihilistic existentialism and amoral metaphysics have influenced contemporary philosophers, most notably Camus and Sartre, making him a crucial link between the 19th and 21st centuries.
Heidegger often coined new words and repurposed existing ones, embedding multiple layers of meaning in single terms, forcing the translator to choose between preserving the original meaning and ensuring readability in English. This translation is designed to allow the armchair philosopher to approach Heidegger's ontology with ease. Thus, unique and esoteric terminology is replaced with the closest literal equivalent in English. Other translations strive to leave these words untranslated; this version leans toward readability to allow the broad strokes of his philosophical project to be understood. One can spend a lifetime unpacking his works, and some have, but these editions are designed for accessibility.
Heidegger often creates compound terms, such as Daseinsanalytik or Existenz, that condense several ideas into single words. These present a unique challenge; their literal translation into English can be cumbersome or obscure. In many cases, we have chosen to break these terms down into their conceptual components in order to convey their full meaning literally. Like Nietzsche, his language is sometimes playful, using puns and idiomatic expressions deeply unique to philosophical German. These linguistic nuances often cannot be translated in a way that preserves both meaning and stylistic intent. Where possible, we have tried to find English equivalents that capture the spirit, if not the letter, of the original pun or idiom. The synthetic fusional German language allows for sentence structures that can be unwieldy in English. We have sometimes had to restructure sentences to preserve readability, striving to retain the original thought process and emphasis, but leaning heavily toward intelligibility for the average reader.
Under 17 U.S.C. § 304, Heidegger's pre-1924 works are public domain in the US. Works published before 1924 are definitively in the public domain under Title 17, Section 305 of the U.S. Code, meaning they can be freely used without permission or payment. For works published between 1923 and 1926, they entered the public domain on January 1, 2022, under the same section, following the expiration of their 95-year copyright term. This places Heidegger’s pre-1927 works firmly in the public domain in the U.S., allowing new translations to be made and published without infringing on copyright.
1910 Explanations of Hölderlin's Poetry
Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) was a German poet and philosopher, widely regarded as one of the most important literary figures of the German Romantic period alongside Goethe and Schiller. His poetry is noted for its beauty, depth, and innovative use of language, and he is often considered a master of the German lyric tradition. Hölderlin's work is characterized by a profound engagement with themes of nature, the divine, and the human condition.
Here, Heidegger pens a philosophic Pathography on Hölderlin, and by extension, the Romantic movement writ large. Heidegger's analysis goes beyond mere literary criticism, delving into the philosophical and existential dimensions of Hölderlin's work. Heidegger interprets Hölderlin's poetry as a medium for exploring profound themes such as the nature of human existence, the relationship between man and the divine, and the role of language and art in human life. Heidegger's exploration of these themes is characterized by his characteristic philosophical rigor and depth, using complex concepts and terminology to dissect Hölderlin's poetry. Heidegger discusses the concept of "the poet's mission" and how this is reflected in Hölderlin's work. He posits that poetry is more than mere artistic expression; it is a medium through which fundamental truths about human existence and the nature of reality are revealed. Heidegger emphasizes the notion of poetry as a form of truth-telling, a way of uncovering and articulating the essential nature of things. This perspective is particularly evident in his analysis of Hölderlin's treatment of themes such as homecoming and the sacred, which Heidegger interprets as metaphors for deeper philosophical insights. The essay is dense with Heidegger's characteristic exploration of language, being, and the intersection of the two as seen through the lens of Hölderlin's poetic works.
Heidegger's explication of Hölderlin's poetry functions fundamentally as a phenomenological investigation into the disclosure of Being through poetic language. His hermeneutical approach reveals not merely an aesthetic appreciation but an ontological excavation of how poetic discourse creates clearings (Lichtungen) where truth can emerge as aletheia. The interpretive framework he develops treats Hölderlin's verses not as objects for literary analysis but as sites where the fourfold (das Geviert) manifests through linguistic revelation. This methodological innovation marks a decisive break from neo-Kantian approaches to aesthetic interpretation, positioning poetry as a privileged mode of access to ontological truth rather than merely a subject for epistemological investigation.
The philosophical significance of Heidegger's reading emerges in his treatment of Hölderlin's engagement with ancient Greek themes, particularly the relationship between mortals and the divine. Through careful etymological analysis and phenomenological reduction, Heidegger demonstrates how Hölderlin's poetic language performs a double movement: it simultaneously reveals the withdrawal of the gods in modernity while creating linguistic spaces where new forms of sacred presence become possible. This dialectical tension between absence and presence, withdrawal and return, forms the core of Heidegger's interpretation. His analysis reveals how Hölderlin's poetry enacts what Heidegger terms the "event" (Ereignis) - moments where Being reveals itself through language while simultaneously concealing itself. This conception challenges traditional metaphysical assumptions about truth as correspondence or representation, instead pointing toward a more fundamental understanding of truth as unconcealment.
Heidegger's hermeneutical approach to Hölderlin anticipates his later critique of technological thinking (Gestell) and the forgetting of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). The poet emerges in his analysis as a figure who resists the instrumental rationality that characterizes modernity by opening spaces where different modes of thinking become possible. This reading operates simultaneously on multiple philosophical registers: as a critique of metaphysical thinking, as an investigation into the nature of language and truth, and as an attempt to overcome what Heidegger sees as the philosophical impasse of Western metaphysics. His interpretation reveals how poetic language can accomplish what conceptual thinking cannot - namely, creating openings where Being can be encountered in its originary manifestation rather than through the distorting lens of metaphysical categories.
1910 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
Heidegger's analysis of Kant's Epistemology (specifically his three critiques) is rooted in the Heideggarian concept of "fundamental ontology," which he defines as the ontological analysis of finite human existence that prepares the ground for metaphysics. This idea is distinct from all forms of anthropology, including philosophical anthropology. Heidegger's aim is to show that the identified ontological analysis of Dasein (a term he famously uses to refer to human existence or being-there) is a necessary condition for understanding the fundamental question: "What is man?"
Heidegger emphasizes the role of "transcendental imagination" in Kant's philosophy, which he sees as crucial for linking the categories of metaphysics with the phenomenon of time. This connection, according to Heidegger, is central to understanding Kant's approach to metaphysics. He argues that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason should be interpreted as a foundational text for metaphysics, suggesting that it presents the problem of metaphysics as that of a fundamental ontology. Heidegger emphasizes the importance of understanding what "foundation" means in this context, likening it to the design of a building plan that includes instructions on how and on what the building should be founded. In this analogy, metaphysics is not an existing building, but is inherent in all human beings as a "natural disposition.
As with all of Heidegger's works, the concept of time and its relation to human cognition and understanding is the crux of his metaphysical project, and his criticism and praise of Kant. He proposes that Kant's work represents a shift in the traditional approach to metaphysics, from a focus on what is to a focus on how human beings understand and interact with the world. This shift, according to Heidegger, is indicative of a deeper, more fundamental level of inquiry into the nature of being and existence, which he believes is essential for a true understanding of metaphysics. In this sense, Kant is a critical nexus point in the history of Philosophy, representing a seismic shift.
Heidegger excavates what he sees as the unexplored ontological foundations of Kant's project. This reading deliberately challenges neo-Kantian interpretations that emphasized epistemological concerns, instead arguing that Kant's true innovation lay in his implicit recognition of temporality as the horizon for understanding Being. Heidegger's interpretation reveals how Kant's analysis of the transcendental imagination points toward a more fundamental questioning of the relationship between Being and time than Kant himself fully recognized.
The philosophical significance of Heidegger's reading emerges in his treatment of finite human cognition as the site where Being becomes intelligible. Heidegger develops an interpretation that foregrounds the temporal character of human understanding. This temporal interpretation of Kantian schematism reveals how time functions not merely as a form of intuition but as the fundamental horizon within which Being becomes meaningful for finite human existence. Heidegger's analysis suggests that Kant's account of transcendental imagination unwittingly points toward what Heidegger terms "fundamental ontology" - an investigation into the temporal conditions that make any understanding of Being possible. This reading fundamentally reconceptualizes the relationship between human finitude and metaphysical knowledge, suggesting that the limitations of human understanding are not merely restrictive but constitutive of our access to Being itself.
Heidegger's engagement with Kant's metaphysics anticipates many of the themes that would become central to his later work, particularly his analysis of temporality and finitude. His interpretation reveals how Kant's critical project, properly understood, contains resources for overcoming traditional metaphysical frameworks that obscure rather than reveal the temporal character of Being. By emphasizing how Kant's analysis of transcendental imagination points toward the essential finitude of human understanding, Heidegger develops a reading that challenges both rationalist metaphysics and neo-Kantian epistemology. This interpretation suggests that the true significance of Kant's critical project lies not in its epistemological limitations but in its implicit recognition of how human finitude structures our understanding of Being. Through this lens, Kant emerges not as the destroyer of metaphysics but as a thinker who inadvertently opened the way toward a more fundamental questioning of the relationship between Being, time, and human finitude.
1912 The Realities Problem in Modern Philosophy
This early essay was first published in the Catholic journal, "Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft", in 1912, and subsequently reprinted several times after that.
Beneath the seemingly straightforward question of realism in modern philosophy lurked a more fundamental problem that Heidegger's 1912 analysis would excavate with surgical precision. Through careful dismantling of contemporary philosophical frameworks, he revealed how the very notion of "reality" had become entangled in presuppositions that obscured rather than illuminated the fundamental question of Being. Not content with merely cataloging different philosophical positions on realism, Heidegger's investigation cut to the heart of how modern philosophy had inherited and transformed ancient questions about the nature of reality.
This work is critical to understand his initial approach to Ontochronology, leading to his advanced theories on the Phenomenology of Time in his major work "Being and Time". Heidegger argues here that time in the historical sciences is not a homogeneous, mathematical series as it is in physics, but rather a qualitative, context-dependent concept. He emphasizes the importance of understanding time in relation to the specific aims and methodologies of historical science, and posits that time in history has a unique meaning and function, deeply bound up with the cultural and human context of historical events. This approach reflects a broader philosophical inquiry into the nature of being and temporality that Heidegger would develop in his later works. Metaphysics has triumphed over Rationalism and Empiricism as the only field that is vectored towards "the only question that matters".
From the dominant neo-Kantian frameworks of his time emerged a peculiar blindness that Heidegger's analysis would expose - their preoccupation with epistemological questions had led modern philosophers to miss the more fundamental ontological issues at stake in the problem of reality. Within their elaborate systems of knowledge and representation lay buried assumptions about Being that demanded excavation. Rather than accepting the terms of debate between realists and idealists, Heidegger's work pushed toward a more radical questioning that would reveal how both positions rested on unexamined metaphysical foundations. Through close examination of how different philosophical schools approached the question of reality, his analysis revealed the limitations of both empiricist and rationalist approaches to understanding the relationship between mind and world.
Deep within the modern philosophical project's attempt to secure objective knowledge lay what Heidegger identified as a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of truth and Being. His investigation showed how contemporary debates about realism had lost touch with the original Greek understanding of truth as aletheia or unconcealment. In place of this more primordial understanding, modern philosophy had substituted various theories of correspondence or coherence that, while sophisticated, failed to address the fundamental question of how beings become accessible to human understanding in the first place. By tracing how this transformation in the understanding of truth and reality had occurred, Heidegger's analysis opened the way for a more fundamental questioning of the relationship between human existence and the manifestation of Being - a questioning that would come to dominate his later philosophical work.
1912 Recent Research on Logic
Heidegger's paper "Recent Research on Logic" examines the development of scientific logic since the early 20th century, challenging the traditional view of logic as a fixed set of forms and rules. It emphasizes the shift from psychologism (the emphasis on psychological principles in logic) to a more transcendental approach, highlighting the work of philosophers such as Husserl and Bolzano in this transition. The paper discusses the nature of logic, its relation to psychology, and the implications of these changes for understanding concepts, judgment, and the theory of categories. It considers the distinction between mental acts and logical content, and argues for the intrinsic value of logic apart from the empirical disciplines. The paper also touches on object theory, judgement theory, and the interplay between logic and mathematics, underlining the continuing development and complexity of logical principles and their application in different fields of study. Heidegger's analysis of contemporary logic shatters conventional interpretations by exposing the hidden ontological assumptions undergirding logical systems. His 1912 examination strips away the technical facades of recent developments in logic to reveal how formalization itself emerges from unexamined presuppositions about Being and truth. Through rigorous engagement with developments in mathematical logic, he demonstrates how the drive toward complete formalization obscures more fundamental questions about the relationship between thought and Being. Not content to merely survey the field, his investigation excavates the metaphysical foundations that both enable and limit modern logical systems.
Beneath the surface of debates about logical form and validity, Heidegger uncovers a more profound crisis in the understanding of truth itself. His analysis reveals how contemporary logic's preoccupation with formal structures and symbolic manipulation represents both an advancement and a retreat - while achieving unprecedented precision in certain domains, modern logical systems simultaneously withdraw from engaging with more fundamental questions about the nature of truth and meaning. Through examination of how different logical frameworks approach the relationship between language and reality, his work exposes the limitations of purely formal approaches to understanding human thought. The development of symbolic logic, he argues, marks not just a technical achievement but a transformation in how we conceive the relationship between mind and world.
The drive toward complete formalization, while powerful within its domain, ultimately fails to address how logical structures themselves emerge from more primordial relationships between human understanding and Being. This critique anticipates his later more explicit rejection of logical positivism and points toward his development of a more fundamental questioning of the relationship between thought, language, and Being.
1913 The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic
Here Heidegger defends metaphysics. He argues that transcendental logic can't be dismissed by rationalism, as this would destroy its own foundation and paralyze judgment and cognition. This work is a comprehensive exploration of the intersection between psychology and logic, focusing on the concept of judgment in the context of psychologism. It begins with a preface acknowledging influences and inspirations, followed by an introduction discussing the impact of psychological research on various fields, including logic. The paper challenges the psychological interpretation of logic and argues for a transcendental-logical view. The main body of the paper is divided into several sections, each examining different aspects and theories related to judgment in the context of psychologism. It includes critical assessments of the theories of notable philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt and Heinrich Maier, analyzing their approaches to judgment, its structure, and its various forms. Within contemporary debates about the foundations of logic, Heidegger detected a profound confusion about the relationship between psychological acts and logical content. His analysis demonstrated how attempts to reduce logical laws to psychological regularities inevitably led to self-contradiction. By tracing the emergence of psychologistic theories from Cartesian assumptions about consciousness, he proved how such approaches necessarily failed to grasp the essential nature of logical truth. The question of judgment, he argued, could not be resolved through empirical investigation of mental processes but required a more fundamental inquiry into the nature of truth itself.
Against psychologism's reduction of logical validity to mental operations, Heidegger advanced a radical reinterpretation of the relationship between thought and Being. His work exposed how psychologistic theories, in their attempt to ground logic in psychology, missed the fundamental difference between the act of judgment and its logical content. This distinction, he argued, pointed toward a more primordial understanding of truth that transcended both psychological and purely formal approaches. By demonstrating the inadequacy of psychologistic explanations, Heidegger cleared the ground for what would later become his more explicit engagement with fundamental ontology. His critique suggested that neither psychological investigation nor formal logic alone could adequately address the question of how truth becomes accessible to human understanding.
1913 Review of "A Selection of Kant's letters"
This is Heidegger’s commentary on the publication “Kant-Laienbrevier. A presentation of Kant's view of the world and life for the unlearned educated person from Kant's writings, letters and oral statements, which was Compiled by F. Groß. Heidegger wrote these comments in 1913/14 and later published them with a forward, which is included here. Heidegger's engagement with Kant's correspondence pointed toward a more nuanced understanding of how the critical philosophy emerged from concrete intellectual struggles rather than abstract speculation alone. The letters showed Kant wrestling with fundamental questions about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge while simultaneously managing mundane academic obligations and personal relationships. This tension between the philosophical and the personal illuminated what Heidegger saw as a crucial aspect of Kant's thought - its grounding in finite human existence rather than abstract rationality. Through this lens, the letters transcended mere biographical interest to become crucial documents for understanding the development and limitations of Kant's critical project. This interpretation anticipated Heidegger's later, more radical reading of Kant as a thinker who unknowingly pointed toward the temporal foundations of human understanding.
1914 The Origin of Art
The Origin of Art (sometimes translated "The Origin of the Works of Art) is one of the foundational texts of 20th-century aesthetics. Heidegger explores the nature and essence of art and its role in revealing truth. He argues that art is not merely a representation or a copy of reality, but that it uniquely brings forth the truth of being. This truth, according to Heidegger, is not an objective, detached truth, but rather a revelation of the world and our place in it. Works of art, he suggests, create their own world and invite the viewer to enter that world, thus opening up new ways of experiencing and understanding being. Heidegger uses examples from various art forms, including architecture and poetry, to illustrate his ideas. Heidegger uses his concepts of Dasein "Being" (meaning being-there or existence), "unveiling" (truth as a process of revealing), and "world" (the context of meaning within which beings appear) in relation to the creation of Art. These concepts are used to explore how art, in its essence, is not merely an aesthetic experience, but a fundamental way of engaging with the truth of our existence. This understanding of Aesthetics as an antidote to the brutality of existence is very Nietzschean.
The work's central thesis - that art functions not as representation but as an originary disclosure of truth - suffers from conceptual ambiguities that undermine its philosophical coherence. By attempting to move beyond neo-Kantian aesthetic theory, Heidegger's analysis falls into potentially circular arguments about the relationship between truth and artistic creation. His treatment of art as a privileged site of ontological revelation lacks sufficient justification, particularly in its dismissal of competing theoretical frameworks. The text oscillates problematically between phenomenological description and metaphysical assertion, never fully resolving the methodological tensions inherent in its approach.
The philosophical implications of Heidegger's early aesthetic theory point toward fundamental problems in his broader philosophical project. His attempt to link artistic creation with historical truth-disclosure relies on questionable assumptions about the nature of both history and truth. The analysis fails to adequately address how specific artworks actually function within concrete historical and social contexts, instead retreating into abstract claims about ontological significance. These theoretical shortcomings would persist in his later work on art, suggesting deep-seated problems in his approach to aesthetic questions. While the text opens important questions about the relationship between art and truth, its theoretical framework remains insufficient for addressing the complexity of artistic practice and experience.
1914 The Time of the World Image
Heidegger here explores Worldviews, focusing on Life-Views. He focuses on the transformation in the way the world is understood and represented in modernity. Heidegger examines the concept of the "world picture," which means more than a mere image of the world; it means a world that has been conceived and grasped as an image. This transformation leads to a fundamental change in the relationship between human beings and their world that underlies modern science, technology, and the understanding of being itself. Heidegger also comments on the origins of Nihilism, although he provides no antidote to the "renunciation of all values".
In Heidegger's 1914 analysis of modernity's relationship to representation, fundamental problems emerge in how scientific and technological thinking transforms human understanding of reality into a "world picture." His investigation into the metaphysical foundations of modern science exposes how the drive to represent reality as an object for calculation and control stems from deeper transformations in Western thinking. The text advances a radical critique of modern subjectivity while simultaneously struggling with internal contradictions about the nature of representation itself.
Heidegger's central argument - that modernity transforms the world into an image or representation for a subject - points toward crucial limitations in contemporary philosophical frameworks. By positioning modern science and technology as manifestations of a more fundamental metaphysical shift, his analysis challenges standard accounts of scientific progress. Yet this critique remains caught within problematic assumptions about historical periodization and the nature of pre-modern thought. His characterization of Greek and medieval worldviews, meant to contrast with modern representational thinking, relies on questionable historical and philosophical premises that undermine the force of his argument.
His work suggests that the transformation of reality into a "world picture" fundamentally alters human existence by positioning the subject as the ground of all meaning and truth. This insight into how representational thinking shapes modern experience offers valuable critical perspectives, yet the text fails to adequately address how alternative modes of understanding might be possible within modernity. The analysis thus remains caught between penetrating diagnosis and problematic gestures toward overcoming modern metaphysic
1914 Hegel's Concept of Experience
Heidegger interprets Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, focusing on the dialectical structure of experience (in German "Erfahrung"). He discusses how Hegel's notion of experience involves a historical and phenomenological unfolding in which consciousness evolves through various stages of self-awareness and self-alienation, ultimately leading to absolute knowledge. Heidegger critically examines this process and its implications for understanding being and truth. His analysis targets the crucial role of experience (Erfahrung) in Hegel's system, arguing that standard interpretations miss its ontological significance by reducing it to mere epistemological progression. The text advances through complex layers of interpretation that strip away accumulated misreadings while exposing fundamental problems in how Hegel conceptualized the relationship between consciousness and its objects.
Within Hegel's account of how consciousness develops through experience, Heidegger detected both profound insight and metaphysical confusion. His reading demonstrates how Hegelian experience involves not merely the accumulation of knowledge but a fundamental transformation in how consciousness understands both itself and its objects. Yet this interpretation also highlights crucial problems in Hegel's attempt to ground absolute knowledge in the movement of experience itself. The analysis reveals internal contradictions in how Hegel conceived the relationship between finite human consciousness and absolute knowing, suggesting that his system ultimately fails to overcome the limitations of metaphysical thinking it sought to transcend.
The philosophical implications of Heidegger's reading strike at the heart of German Idealism's project. By focusing on Hegel's concept of experience rather than more commonly emphasized aspects of his system, the text opens new perspectives on both the achievements and limitations of absolute idealism. Heidegger's analysis suggests that Hegel's understanding of experience, while breaking important ground in conceptualizing the dynamic relationship between consciousness and its objects, remained trapped within problematic metaphysical assumptions about the nature of truth and knowledge.
1914 Nietzsche's Proclamation "God is Dead"
This essay is part of Heidegger's extensive engagement with Nietzsche's philosophy and the topic of Nihilism. Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's famous proclamation that "God is dead" not merely as a statement about religious belief, but as an indication of a profound metaphysical shift in the Western understanding of Being- it is rather an observation than a belief. He explores how this declaration reflects the end of traditional metaphysical and moral frameworks and the work that must be done to return back to the question which these frameworks have obscured for millennia- the question of Being.His reading positions Nietzsche's declaration not as mere atheistic polemic but as diagnosis of a profound transformation in how truth and value manifest in the modern world. The text advances through multiple interpretive layers, each peeling back superficial readings to expose how the "death of God" signals the collapse of absolute metaphysical foundations.
Heidegger's interpretation locates within Nietzsche's pronouncement a complex meditation on nihilism's emergence from Western metaphysics itself. By tracing how Platonic-Christian frameworks established truth and value through reference to supersensory realms, the analysis shows how their inevitable collapse leads to what Nietzsche termed "the highest values devaluing themselves." Yet this reading also identifies crucial problems in Nietzsche's response to nihilism. His attempt to overcome metaphysics through will to power, Heidegger argues, remains trapped within metaphysical patterns of thinking even as it strives to transcend them. The text thus exposes fundamental tensions in Nietzsche's project that would later shape Heidegger's own critique of Western metaphysics.
The philosophical significance of Heidegger's reading emerges through his demonstration of how Nietzsche's thought simultaneously culminates and undermines the Western metaphysical tradition. While acknowledging Nietzsche's radical break with traditional metaphysics, the analysis shows how his concepts of will to power and eternal return unwittingly perpetuate metaphysical assumptions about the nature of Being. This critique suggests that Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism through revaluation of all values fails to address more fundamental questions about the relationship between Being and human understanding. Such tensions illuminate broader problems in any attempt to overcome metaphysics while remaining within its conceptual framework - a difficulty that would drive Heidegger's later philosophical investigations into more radical questioning of Western thought's foundations.
Nietzsche, in a letter from 1887, defines Nihilism as meaning “that "That the highest values devalue themselves."
The collection this paper comes from, Holzwege, is second only to "Being and Time" in fame. Here he levies some of his most perceptive commentary on Hegel, Descartes, Nietzsche, Anaximander, Rilke, and Hölderlin. Wood Paths consists of a collection of essays that reflect on philosophical and existential questions through the analysis of art, poetry, and history. The original German title "Holzwege" refers to the logging paths in German forests, which anyone who's hiked in Germany knows are always dead-ends. Hence, this is sometimes translated as "dead ends" or "logging roads" or "Off the Beaten Track" or something along those lines, as this is what the title means- the dead end trails of philosophy and the inherent obscurity of the pursuit of Being.
1914 Why Poets?
Heidegger continues his reflection on Aesthetics, this time focusing on German poetry. reflects on the role of poetry and the poet in the modern world. He argues that poets play a crucial role in revealing truths about being and existence, especially in times of crisis or technological domination, when the nature of humanity and its relationship to the world are in danger of being obscured. This essay underscores Heidegger's belief in the unique capacity of art, and poetry in particular, to reveal fundamental aspects of being.
The collection this paper comes from, Holzwege, is second only to "Being and Time" in fame. Here he levies some of his most perceptive commentary on Hegel, Descartes, Nietzsche, Anaximander, Rilke, and Hölderlin. Wood Paths consists of a collection of essays that reflect on philosophical and existential questions through the analysis of art, poetry, and history. The original German title "Holzwege" refers to the logging paths in German forests, which anyone who's hiked in Germany knows are always dead-ends. Hence, this is sometimes translated as "dead ends" or "logging roads" or "Off the Beaten Track" or something along those lines, as this is what the title means- the dead end trails of philosophy and the inherent obscurity of the pursuit of Being. Heidegger uses these essays to explore his ontological inquiries, particularly the nature of being and the relationship between human beings and the world around them.
The analysis moves through concentric rings of questioning - first addressing the seeming irrelevance of poetry in a technological age, then pushing deeper into how poetic language might offer resistance to what Heidegger terms "calculative thinking." His reading posits poets as those who track the traces of fled gods while simultaneously preparing for new possibilities of divine presence. Yet this interpretation stumbles on internal contradictions, particularly in its attempt to position poetry as somehow outside or resistant to technological enframing. The text's valorization of certain poetic voices risks romanticizing a pre-technological past while failing to adequately theorize poetry's concrete historical and social functions.
Within Heidegger's meditation on poetic calling lurks a more radical questioning of language itself. His analysis suggests that poetic language differs fundamentally from everyday communication or scientific discourse - not merely in style or content but in its relationship to truth and Being. This claim carries profound implications for understanding both the nature of language and the possibility of non-instrumental modes of thinking. Yet the text struggles to ground these sweeping assertions about poetic essence, often resorting to quasi-mystical pronouncements rather than rigorous philosophical argumentation. Such theoretical tensions plague the work's attempt to establish poetry's privileged ontological status, pointing toward broader problems in Heidegger's later thinking about language and art.
1914 The Saying of Anaximander
Heidegger builds an expansive interpretation of Anaximander's only surviving fragment of text. He uses this one sentence as a starting point to discuss themes of being, becoming, and the enigmatic core of human existence. Heidegger reads Anaximander's saying in a way that aligns with his own philosophical inquiries into the emergence and withdrawal of being, the interplay of presence and absence, and the fundamental question of Being.
The collection this paper comes from, Holzwege, is second only to "Being and Time" in fame. Here he levies some of his most perceptive commentary on Hegel, Descartes, Nietzsche, Anaximander, Rilke, and Hölderlin. Wood Paths consists of a collection of essays that reflect on philosophical and existential questions through the analysis of art, poetry, and history. The original German title "Holzwege" refers to the logging paths in German forests, which anyone who's hiked in Germany knows are always dead-ends. Hence, this is sometimes translated as "dead ends" or "logging roads" or "Off the Beaten Track" or something along those lines, as this is what the title means- the dead end trails of philosophy and the inherent obscurity of the pursuit of Being. Heidegger uses these essays to explore his ontological inquiries, particularly the nature of being and the relationship between human beings and the world around them.
The analysis centers on Anaximander's cryptic statement about justice and injustice among beings, reading in this fragment a fundamental insight into the temporal character of Being itself. Heidegger's interpretation breaks sharply from philological orthodoxy by suggesting that standard translations obscure the fragment's ontological significance. His reading locates in Anaximander's language an understanding of Being that precedes the metaphysical frameworks of Plato and Aristotle. However, this interpretation strains historical credibility through its projection of later philosophical concerns onto pre-Socratic thought. The text's attempt to find in Anaximander an anticipation of Heidegger's own philosophical preoccupations risks serious anachronism.
The philosophical implications of Heidegger's reading highlight crucial problems in how Western thinking conceptualizes its relationship to its Greek origins. His analysis suggests that early Greek thought harbored insights about Being that were subsequently forgotten or obscured by metaphysical traditions. Yet this claim relies on questionable assumptions about both the nature of early Greek thinking and the possibility of recovering its "true" meaning through philosophical interpretation. The text's methodological difficulties point toward broader problems in Heidegger's attempt to overcome metaphysical thinking through return to pre-Socratic sources. His reading of Anaximander, while philosophically provocative, ultimately fails to establish convincing grounds for claiming privileged access to pre-metaphysical thought.
1915 Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning
Martin Heidegger's dissertation on Duns Scotus, entitled "Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning" (original German: "Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus"), was originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation in 1915. Heidegger analyses Scotus's doctrine of categories and provides a detailed explanation of the Grammatica Speculativa, a work of medieval grammar now known to have been written by Thomas of Erfurt. This work is significant because it represents an early foray into Heidegger's lifelong philosophical concerns, particularly the question of being in the guise of the problem of categories and the question of language in the guise of the doctrine of meaning.
Heidegger adopts a historical-philosophical approach, meticulously analysing and interpreting Duns Scotus' theories in the context of both medieval scholasticism and modern philosophical thought. He stresses the need to go beyond a purely historical analysis and to engage with the systematic philosophical content inherent in Scotus' work. Here Heidegger places a strong emphasis on categorisation, not just as an intellectual exercise, but as a critical tool for understanding the structure of reality and knowledge. The analysis delves into the nuances of Scotus' categories, exploring their implications for the conceptualisation of reality and the formation of meaning. This exploration is grounded in a clear understanding of the historical development of these ideas, providing a rich context for their appreciation and critique.
His analysis disrupts standard interpretations of Scotist thought by positioning the medieval logician's work not merely as scholastic speculation but as a crucial development in theories of signification. The text moves through dense layers of medieval logical theory to uncover insights that anticipate modern phenomenological approaches to meaning.
Within Scotus' treatment of categories, Heidegger detected sophisticated insights into the relationship between language, thought, and reality that transcended conventional scholastic frameworks. His reading demonstrates how Scotist theories of univocity and formal distinction pointed toward more nuanced understandings of how meaning functions in different domains of discourse. Yet this interpretation also highlights significant tensions in Scotus' attempt to reconcile Aristotelian categories with medieval theological demands. The analysis uncovers problematic assumptions in how Scotus conceived the relationship between logical categories and metaphysical reality - assumptions that would later influence the development of modern philosophical logic.
The philosophical significance of Heidegger's reading strikes at fundamental questions about the nature of meaning and categorization. His analysis suggests that Scotus' logical works harbored insights about the relationship between language and reality that later scholastic and modern philosophy failed to adequately appreciate. However, the text struggles with methodological problems in its attempt to bridge medieval and modern philosophical frameworks. These difficulties point toward broader issues in how contemporary philosophy engages with medieval thought - issues that would shape Heidegger's later critiques of Western metaphysics. The work thus occupies an ambiguous position between historical scholarship and philosophical appropriation, never fully resolving tensions between these competing demands.
1916 The Concept of Time in the Study of History
Heidegger contrasts this with the use of time in the natural sciences, especially physics. The paper begins with general remarks on science and the theory of science, then moves into a detailed examination of the role and structure of the concept of time in historical research. It is argued that time in history has a qualitative, unique character that differs from its quantitative and homogeneous character in physics. The paper also discusses the methodological aspects of historical science and the importance of time in understanding and categorizing historical events, emphasizing the distinct nature of historical time. The investigation targets crucial limitations in how historical scholarship treats time as a neutral medium for arranging past events. Heidegger's critique demonstrates that standard historiographical methods rest on problematic assumptions about the nature of temporal experience inherited from natural science. By reducing historical time to measurable chronological sequence, these approaches miss how temporal understanding emerges from more fundamental structures of human existence. Yet this criticism itself raises methodological difficulties about how historical research might proceed without presupposing objective chronological frameworks. The text oscillates between penetrating critique and ambiguous gestures toward alternative conceptions of historical time.
The philosophical stakes of Heidegger's analysis strike at the foundations of historical methodology itself. His work suggests that conventional approaches to historical time fail to grasp how temporal understanding shapes both the object and method of historical research. This insight carries profound implications for the possibility of historical knowledge, pointing toward fundamental problems in how scholarship conceives its relationship to past events. The text thus opens crucial questions about the nature of historical understanding while struggling to articulate viable alternatives to standard chronological frameworks. These theoretical tensions would persist in Heidegger's later work on temporality and historical existence, suggesting deep-seated problems in any attempt to think historical time outside conventional metaphysical patterns.
1918 The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism
Heidegger's "The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism" (original German "Die Philosophischen Grundlagen Der Mittelalterlichen Mystik") is a draft for a lecture written in 1918/19 but never delivered. Here Heidegger examines the phenomenological understanding of religious experience, distinguishing it from historical, metaphysical, and psychological perspectives, addressing the methodological challenges of interpreting mystical experiences, emphasizing the importance of a primordial understanding that transcends theoretical biases. Central themes include the experiential and theoretical aspects of mysticism, its metaphysical interpretation, and the philosophical complexities inherent in the study of religious consciousness. Through close reading of figures like Meister Eckhart and Johannes Tauler, the text advances a radical reinterpretation of how medieval mystics conceptualized the relationship between human understanding and divine truth. Yet this reading raises significant methodological problems about how philosophical analysis can approach mystical experience without reducing it to conceptual frameworks. The text's attempt to locate rational foundations in mystical thought struggles with internal contradictions about the very possibility of grounding ineffable experience in philosophical categories.
The philosophical implications of Heidegger's analysis point toward fundamental difficulties in how Western metaphysics conceptualizes the relationship between reason and experience. His reading suggests that medieval mystical texts harbored insights about human understanding that transcended conventional philosophical frameworks, particularly in their treatment of the relationship between finite human thought and infinite divine truth. However, the work suffers from crucial limitations in its attempt to bridge philosophical and mystical modes of discourse. By seeking philosophical foundations for mystical experience, Heidegger's analysis risks imposing conceptual structures onto phenomena that mystical writers themselves characterized as exceeding all categories. These theoretical tensions illuminate broader problems in any attempt to subject religious experience to philosophical analysis - difficulties that would shape Heidegger's later investigations into the nature of truth and human understanding.
1919 Introduction to Philosophy
Heidegger emphasizes the idea that philosophy cannot be understood as just another academic discipline or field of study. He argues against the notion of philosophy as a science or a body of knowledge, stating that philosophy is neither purely academic nor purely theoretical. Instead, he insists on the importance of understanding philosophy as a way of being, a fundamental mode of human existence that shapes our understanding of the world and ourselves. This perspective is rooted in Heidegger's broader philosophical project of questioning and understanding the nature of Being. Throughout the paper, Heidegger uses a variety of terms and concepts unique to his philosophical language, such as "Dasein" (the being there or existence of humans) and "Being" (the nature or essence of existence), to articulate his ideas. These concepts are crucial to understanding Heidegger's perspective on the inseparability of philosophy from human existence and the need for a new approach to philosophical inquiry.
This edition was re-created from a photocopy of Heidegger's handwritten manuscript. The manuscript comprises 106 quarto leaves written in landscape format, with the main text on the left and additions, inserts, and references on the right. Some of these additions were made post-lecture. The manuscript is supplemented by an enclosure booklet with notes. Heidegger's work is divided into three sections: Philosophy and Science, Philosophy and Worldview, and Philosophy and History. The section on Philosophy and Worldview is notably expanded with an in-depth discussion of Kant's concept of the world, though more than twenty pages of this discussion were not included in the presentation.
The philosophical significance of Heidegger's pedagogical innovations strikes at core questions about the relationship between philosophical thinking and lived experience. His lectures suggest that standard academic approaches to philosophy fail to grasp how philosophical understanding emerges from concrete situations rather than abstract theoretical frameworks. This insight carries profound implications for both philosophical methodology and education, pointing toward fundamental problems in how academic institutions structure philosophical learning. The text thus opens crucial questions about the nature of philosophical understanding while struggling with inherent tensions between institutional demands and authentic philosophical thinking. These theoretical difficulties would persist throughout Heidegger's career, suggesting deep-seated problems in any attempt to teach philosophy within conventional academic frameworks while simultaneously calling those frameworks into question.
1919 Notes on Karl Jasper’s “Psychology of World Approaches”
Heidegger explores Jaspers' concept of worldview psychology, which seeks to understand human mental and spiritual being in its comprehensive totality. Heidegger critically engages with Jaspers' exploration of the limits of the soul's life and how this leads to a clearer overall horizon for understanding the soul. Heidegger's approach is characterized by his typical philosophical depth, focusing on the methodological aspects and fundamental implications of Jaspers' work. Heidegger examines how Jaspers' psychology attempts to provide clarifications and possibilities for self-contemplation, emphasizing its philosophical rather than scientific nature.
Heidegger also critiques Jaspers' approach to psychology from a philosophical perspective, questioning the basic assumptions and methods employed. He discusses the role of Weltanschauungspsychologie in understanding mental positions, processes, and stages, and how this effort is consistent with philosophical inquiry. Heidegger's analysis is not only a critique of Jaspers' psychological theories, but also a broader inquiry into the nature of human understanding and the role of psychology in this process. He reflects on the limitations and potential biases in Jaspers' approach, particularly in how it frames and interprets human existence and consciousness. Throughout the paper, Heidegger's examination is deeply rooted in his own philosophical framework, using his own distinctive terminology and concepts to dissect and understand Jaspers' psychological approach.
Within Heidegger's critique lurks a more radical questioning of the relationship between science and philosophy itself. His engagement with Jaspers' work suggests that attempts to ground philosophical anthropology in empirical observation necessarily miss the fundamental nature of human existence. Yet this criticism itself raises significant methodological difficulties about how philosophy might approach human experience without relying on scientific frameworks. Such theoretical tensions illuminate broader problems in any attempt to develop a "scientific" understanding of human existence - difficulties that would drive both Heidegger and Jaspers toward increasingly divergent philosophical paths in subsequent years.
1920 Phenomenology of the View and Impression of the Theory of Philosophical Conceptual Debt
Heidegger's work critically examines the role and function of a "theory of philosophical concept formation" in phenomenology, suggesting that this topic, while seemingly specialized, is essential for understanding broader philosophical issues. The text debates the nature and implications of phenomenological methods, touching on topics like the relationship between absolute and relative concepts, the problem of life as a central phenomenon, and the dichotomy between rational and irrational elements in philosophy. It also explores historical and cultural contexts in philosophy, analyzing how these aspects influence philosophical thinking and concept formation. Heidegger focuses on phenomenological destruction (Destruktion) in philosophy, particularly in the context of phenomenology. It highlights the importance of understanding the origin and direction of meanings in philosophical concepts, emphasizing that these meanings often point to larger, interconnected contexts. The text stresses that phenomenological destruction is not aimless or arbitrary, but is instead a directed deconstruction that leads into the situation of following preconceptions and the execution of preconceptions, thus arriving at foundational experiences.
The text also discusses the phenomenon of "pre-signing" (Vorzeichnung) and "pre-grasping" (Vorgriff), explaining that these are fundamental to understanding how multiple meanings and unity of meaning are characterized and founded. It notes that phenomenological destruction is inherently linked to the act of philosophizing and is not just a methodological tool for limited purposes. This is because philosophy is always an element of factual life experience and not just abstract definitions. Heidegger naturally pivots back to the understanding of history in various contexts, outlining six different meanings of 'history' and how each reflects different aspects of life experience and philosophical inquiry. These meanings range from history as a field of study, to a tradition, to personal or city history, and even to history as an occurrence or incident. This exploration serves to illustrate the complexity and richness of phenomenological analysis in philosophy.
The philosophical implications of Heidegger's phenomenological analyses during this time struck at core questions about the nature of conceptual thinking itself. His work suggested that standard philosophical approaches failed to grasp how concepts emerge from more fundamental structures of human existence. This insight carried profound implications for philosophical methodology, pointing toward inherent limitations in how traditional philosophy understood its own conceptual foundations. These theoretical tensions would drive Heidegger's subsequent development of fundamental ontology.
1921 Augustine and Neoplatonism
In the summer semester of 1921, Heidegger lectured on "Augustinus and Neoplatonism. The original manuscript, consisting of 19 pages, contains a continuous text on the left and space for notes on the right. The complex nature of Heidegger's marginal notes, often interspersed with the main text, required careful transcription. The editors have ensured clarity by enclosing the notes in round brackets and placing them at the end of each paragraph. The edition also includes additional material relating to Heidegger's studies of religion and mysticism in 1918/19, which sheds light on the development of his early philosophical ideas. The thorough work of the editors, together with the collaboration of the contributors, contributes to a comprehensive understanding of Heidegger's lectures and their significance for his philosophical development.
Heidegger critically examines Augustine's incorporation and transformation of Neoplatonic concepts, focusing in particular on notions of Being, temporality, and selfhood. This analysis is not a mere historical account, but a phenomenological exploration of how Augustine reconceptualizes these ideas within a Christian framework. He examines Augustine's concepts of 'being', 'temporality', and 'ontology' and shows how they are deeply influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy. Heidegger's approach, however, is not merely to trace philosophical influences, but to uncover the existential dimensions in Augustine's thought. Heidegger illuminates how Augustine navigates and redefines the Neoplatonic heritage in order to address fundamental questions of existence, truth, and the human condition within a Christian paradigm. Heidegger's exploration is thus both a critical analysis of Augustine's philosophical adaptation and a reflection on the existential and phenomenological implications of this synthesis. He notes that while both Judaism and Christianity contain inherently Platonic Ontological concepts, Augustine further synthesized Neoplatonism around the conceptualization Dasein to form a distinctly Latin flavor of Theanthropic Philosophy.
From the fusion of Christian experience and Neoplatonic categories emerged profound tensions that Heidegger's analysis targets with relentless focus. His reading demonstrates how Augustine's attempt to understand temporal human existence through eternal Platonic forms created unsustainable philosophical contradictions. Within these tensions lurked deeper problems about how Western metaphysics conceived the relationship between finite human understanding and absolute truth. Through Augustine's spiritual struggles, Heidegger traced the emergence of philosophical problems that would haunt subsequent Christian thought.
Against both theological orthodoxy and secular dismissal, Heidegger's interpretation positions Augustine's texts as crucial sites where religious experience confronted philosophical questioning. His analysis suggests that beneath doctrinal formulations lay phenomenological insights about human temporality that later theological frameworks obscured. Yet this reading itself raises methodological difficulties about how philosophical analysis might approach religious experience without reducing it to conceptual categories. Such problems point toward fundamental limitations in how Western thought conceived the relationship between philosophical reason and religious understanding.
1921 Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion
In the winter semester of 1920/21 at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger delivered a lecture titled "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion." Although the original lecture manuscript is lost, five sets of notes from students (Oskar Becker, Helene Weiß, Franz-Josef Brecht, and others) have allowed for a partial reconstruction of the lecture. The notes reveal that Heidegger's lecture can be divided into two distinct parts, separated by a hiatus on November 30, 1920, due to unspecified objections. Oskar Becker's notes, in particular, indicate the interruption and the shift from a "Methodical Introduction" to a "Phenomenological Explication of Concrete Religious Phenomena."
Deep within Pauline texts, Heidegger uncovers temporal structures that resist theological systematization. His reading demonstrates how early Christian life oriented itself through a distinctive temporality - not the eternal present of Greek metaphysics, but an urgent anticipation of divine irruption into history. Yet this temporal orientation resists capture in philosophical concepts. The more precisely his analysis tries to grasp it, the more it slips away. Like trying to photograph quantum phenomena, the very act of observation alters what's being observed. The methodological paradox haunts every page.
This work is largely Exegetical as he examines Biblical passages utilizing a range of texts, utilizing a range of translations and tracing the slight differences including Erasmus' Novum Testamentum Graece cum apparatu critico ex editionibus et libris used by Melanchthon. Heidegger uses his distinctive phenomenological methodology to deconstruct religious experience, analyzing its fundamental elements and its significance for human existence. He ventures beyond traditional theological inquiry, integrating phenomenological, psychological, and historical dimensions to explore the nature of religion. Heidegger's approach is not a cataloguing of religious beliefs or practices, but rather an in-depth examination of the nature of religious experience, its impact on human consciousness, and its existential significance. This work is emblematic of Heidegger's broader philosophical project, which seeks to understand the fundamental nature of Being, Dasein, and Existence through the examination of various human experiences, including religion. The influence of Kierkegaard is palpable in this work in his rejection of the Positivist English Empiricist line of thought.
1923 Hegel's Phenomenology
The lecture "Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit" was given for two hours in the winter semester 1930/31 in Freiburg, one piece in a lifeline of engagement with Hegel's works.
Heidegger analyzes the role of the Phenomenology of Spirit as the first part of Hegel's "system of science," emphasizing its foundational status in relation to the entire system. He questions the intricate relationship between the concepts of consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, and how they interact in Hegel's dialectical process. Heidegger's discussion also touches on the nature of absolute knowledge as opposed to relative knowledge, highlighting Hegel's conception of knowledge as not merely a quantitative accumulation but a qualitative transformation.
Heidegger's interpretation positions the Phenomenology as a site where metaphysical thinking confronts its own temporal foundations. The analysis suggests that Hegel's text harbors insights that transcend its systematic framework - insights that emerge precisely through the failure of dialectical closure. This reading exposes how consciousness' resistance to complete self-knowledge derives not from contingent limitations but from temporal structures constitutive of understanding itself. Such theoretical tensions illuminate fundamental problems in metaphysical conceptions of truth and knowledge.
Heidegger's analysis of Hegel's work is characterized by an in-depth consideration of the terms "absolute" and "relative" as they apply to knowledge, and their implications for the idea of spirit or "mind. He traces Hegel's dialectical method, exploring how consciousness evolves through stages of experience to reach a form of self-knowledge and ultimately absolute knowledge. This development is seen as central to Hegel's philosophical enterprise, and the Phenomenology of Spirit is seen not as an isolated work but as an essential component of Hegel's overarching philosophical system. Heidegger thus positions Hegel's Phenomenology as a crucial step in the self-development of the mind, leading to the ultimate realization of absolute knowledge. This interpretation underscores Heidegger's perspective on Hegel's methodology and philosophical ambitions, particularly in relation to the concepts of experience, consciousness, and the nature of knowledge itself.
Heidegger's analysis demonstrates how systematic philosophy necessarily obscures insights about human finitude that emerge through its very failure. The text traces how consciousness' temporal character resists dialectical sublation, revealing limitations inherent in metaphysical frameworks. These interpretive breaks open crucial questions about the possibility of philosophical understanding - questions that would drive subsequent attempts to think beyond traditional metaphysical categories.
The implications strike at foundational assumptions about both Hegel's achievement and systematic philosophy's possibilities. Heidegger's reading reveals how attempts to achieve absolute knowledge remain caught within temporal structures they cannot master. Yet this very inability points toward essential insights about human understanding that systematic thought must deny. The analysis thus initiates a fundamental questioning of metaphysical thinking itself.